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ABORTION, PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE AND
THE CONSTITUTION: THE VIEW FROM
WITHOUT AND WITHIN
ROBERT A. SEDLER*
INTRODUCTION
The theme of this symposium, "The Beginning and End of
Life," has led me to undertake an examination of how abortion
and physician-assisted suicide have been "taken into our constitu-
tional system"' and of the societal impact of the Supreme Court's
constitutional treatment of these issues. This examination will be
based in considerable part on my own experiences, nearly a quar-
ter century apart, in litigating constitutional challenges to bans
on abortion and bans on physician-assisted suicide.2 In the
1970's, while on the law faculty at the University of Kentucky, I
litigated the "Kentucky version" of Roe v. Wade,3 in asserting the
Kentucky ACLU's challenge to the state's "life only" abortion
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University. A.B., 1956, J.D., 1959,
University of Pittsburgh.
1. This expression is borrowed from Robert Dixon, Bakke: A
Constitutional Analysis, 67 CAL. L. REV. 69,70 (1979).
2. Because of my litigation involvement in abortion and physician-assisted
suicide, my discussion and analysis will lack the purported impartial and
dispassionate perspective of the pure legal scholar. But I believe that there is an
existential as well as an objective component to legal scholarship, and that
participation and involvement might thus yield insights that detached
observation could not possibly supply. In addition to assisted suicide, see Robert
A. Sedler, Constitutional Challenges to Bans on "Assisted Suicide": The View from
Without and Within, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 777 (1994) [hereinafter Sedler,
Constitutional Challenges]; Robert A. Sedler, Are Absolute Bans on Assisted Suicide
Constitutional? I Say No, 72 U. DET. L. REV. 725 (1995) [hereinafter Sedler,
Absolute Bans], I have approached a number of legal questions from the dual
perspective of an academic commentator and a litigating lawyer. See, e.g.,
Robert A. Sedler, The Unconstitutionality of Campus Bans on "Racist Speech": The
View from Without and Within, 53 U. Pi-r. L. Riv. 631 (1992); Robert A. Sedler,
The Summary Contempt Power and the Constitution: The View from Without and
Within, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 34 (1976); Robert A. Sedler, Metropolitan Desegregation
in the Wake of Milliken-On Losing Big Battles and Winning Small Wars: The View
Largely from Within, 1975 WASH. U. LQ. 535 (1975); Robert A. Sedler, The
Procedural Defense in Selective Service Prosecutions: The View from Without and Within,
56 IowA L. REv. 1121 (1971).
3. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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prohibition,4 and, following the Supreme Court's decision in Roe,
to Kentucky's "round two" anti-abortion law, 5 which was essen-
tially the same law invalidated by the Court in Planned Parenthood
v. Danforth.6 In the 1990's, now on the law faculty at Wayne State
University in Detroit, I litigated the Michigan ACLU's unsuccess-
ful challenge to Michigan's ban on physician-assisted suicide.7 As
I litigator, then, I have strongly advocated recognition of a
woman's constitutional right to a safe and legal abortion and rec-
ognition of a terminally ill person's constitutional right, in the
end stages of that person's terminal illness, to make the choice to
hasten inevitable death by the use of physician-prescribed medi-
cations. As an academic commentator, however, I must now deal
with the fact that while the Supreme Court has recognized in Roe
and reaffirmed in Casey8 that a woman does have a constitutional
right to a safe and legal abortion, in Vacco9 and Glucksberg'° , the
Court held that a terminally ill person does not have a constitu-
tional right to make the choice to hasten inevitable death by the
use of physician-prescribed medications, and that no one, includ-
ing a terminally ill person in the end stages of terminal illness,
has a constitutional right to "commit suicide." In this article I
will discuss the legal, social and political context in which these
two fundamental constitutional and societal issues were litigated
and resolved by the Supreme Court. I will also discuss the socie-
tal impact that has followed from recognition of a woman's con-
stitutional right to a safe and legal abortion, and what I believe
will be the societal impact of the Court's refusal to recognize a
constitutional "right to die," while at the same time recognizing
that every person does have a right, assumedly protected by the
Constitution, to refuse or discontinue life-saving medical treat-
ment, and that a terminally ill person has a similar right to
4. See Crossen v. Attorney Gen., 344 F. Supp. 587 (E.D. Ky. 1972) (three-
judge). I was spectacularly unsuccessful in this challenge, losing the case before
the then-required statutory three-judge court, 3-0. Upon remand following Roe,
the district judge reluctantly declared the Kentucky anti-abortion law
unconstitutional, but refused to issue an injunction against its enforcement.
5. Wolfe v. Schroering, 388 F. Supp. 631 (W.D. Ky. 1974), affd in part,
rev'd in part, 541 F. 2d 523 (6th Cir. 1976).
6. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
7. Hobbins v. Attorney Gen., decided with and reported as People v.
Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 714 (1995).
8. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
9. Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
10. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
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receive all the medication necessary to alleviate pain and suffer-
ing even if this has the effect of hastening the person's death."1
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A SAFE AND LEGAL ABORTION
Constitutional cases do not just "happen," as one might
think if one were only to look at the cases decided by the
Supreme Court, as they appear in constitutional law casebooks
and are discussed in academic commentary. There are reasons
why particular kinds of constitutional cases are brought at partic-
ular times, and these reasons are best understood in terms of
their legal, social, and political context. The constitutional chal-
lenges to legal prohibitions on abortion that culminated in the
Supreme Court's 1973 decisions in Roe v. Wade12 and the com-
panion case of Doe v. Bolton13 (which we will hereinafter refer to
collectively as "Roe") were precipitated by the 1960's "sexual
revolution" and the emergence of the women's rights movement,
and were facilitated by the Supreme Court's recognition of a so-
called constitutional "right of privacy" in Griswold v. Connecticut.4
At the beginning of the 1960's, in virtually every state, abor-
tion was prohibited except where the abortion was necessary to
save the life of the mother. The organized medical profession
also opposed abortion, and those few physicians who were willing
to perform abortions, if discovered, were not only subject to
criminal prosecution, but were likely to lose their licenses as
well. 5 Such abortions as were performed at that time then were
illegal "back-alley" abortions, often performed by non-physicians,
and putting the woman at serious risk. Then as now, there were
11. In saying that a person has a constitutionally protected right to refuse
or discontinue life-saving medical treatment and to receive all the medication
necessary to alleviate pain, I am referring, of course, to a constitutional
requirement that the state cannot interfere with the person's exercise of that
right, such as by requiring physicians to provide or continue life-saving medical
treatment against the patient's will or prohibiting physicians from providing all
the medication necessary to alleviate the patient's pain if this will hasten the
patient's death.
12. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
13. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
14. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
15. The American Medical Association had been opposed to abortion
since the late 19th century. In 1967, the AMA took the position that
therapeutic abortion was ethically permissible in certain circumstances. In
1970, the AMA took the position that abortion was a medical procedure that
should be performed by a licensed physician in an accredited hospital only after
consultation with two other physicians and in conformity with state law, and
that no party to the procedure should be required to violate personally held
moral principles. See the discussion of the AMA's position in Roe, 410 U.S. at
141-44.
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a large number of unwanted pregnancies resulting from the lack
of contraceptive use or from contraceptive failure, and for most
women abortion was not a feasible option. The end result was
that large numbers of women were compelled to carry unwanted
pregnancies to term.
The unavailability of safe and legal abortion had significant
social consequences. Married women and their husbands would
have an additional child to raise, with the attendant impact on
the family's economic well-being. For the woman who was
unmarried, the choice was to enter into a "shotgun marriage"
with the putative father if he was willing to do so, to undergo the
stigma of bearing an out-of-wedlock child (and admit to having
had non-marital intercourse, which in many circles was socially
and morally unacceptable at that time), or to conceal the preg-
nancy as best as she was able and to surrender the child for adop-
tion upon birth. While the number of unwanted pregnancies
was not easily measurable, they clearly contributed to the "popu-
lation explosion" that was identified as a major social problem in
the United States in the early 1960's.16 The large number of
unwanted pregnancies to unmarried women also meant that
large numbers of healthy newborn babies were available for
adoption, and middle-class families, at least, had no difficulty in
adopting one or more children.
The "sexual revolution" of the 1960's and the increasing
acceptability among young people of "sex without marriage" also
presumably increased the number of unwanted pregnancies and
the desire of many unmarried women to terminate those
pregnancies by a safe and legal abortion. The 1960's also saw the
emergence of the women's rights movement and the demand for
recognition of a woman's "ability to control her destiny and her
ability to participate equally in the economic and social life of
the Nation."17 In the forefront of this movement was the asser-
tion of a woman's right to control over own body, and to termi-
nate an unwanted pregnancy by a safe and legal abortion.
One part of the effort to provide a woman with the right to a
safe and legal abortion was directed at obtaining some legislative
modification of the existing laws prohibiting abortion. In many
states this effort was unsuccessful. Some states, however, did "lib-
16. See, e.g., PAUL EHRLICH, THE POPULATION BOMB (1968).
17. In Casey, the Court noted that, "[t]he destiny of the woman must be
shaped to a large extent on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and
her place in society", Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852, and that,
"[t]he ability of women to participate in the economic and social life of the
Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives."
Id. at 856.
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eralize" their abortion laws to allow abortions in certain circum-
stances, such as where the pregnancy was the result of rape or
incest, or where the pregnancy threatened the woman's health.
At the time of Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton, these efforts had
succeeded to some degree, but as the Georgia law at issue in Doe
indicated, this liberalization was usually accompanied by regula-
tory restrictions, such as the need for two-doctor concurrence.18
It was not until 1970 that one of the nation's largest states, New
York, completely removed all legal prohibitions against abor-
tion.19 And, as the Right to Life movement and other opponents
of abortion became better organized politically, efforts at legisla-
tive reform faltered badly in most states."
The other part of this effort was directed at asserting a con-
stitutional challenge to state anti-abortion laws. This effort was
possible because of the Supreme Court's 1965 decision in Gris-
wold v. Connecticut,1 where the Court, in invalidating a nine-
teenth-century Connecticut law that prohibited the use of
contraceptives, including presumably their use by married
couples, held that the prohibition violated the married couple's
so-called constitutional "right of privacy." Like all other areas of
law, constitutional law develops in a line of growth. The Supreme
Court's decisions in prior cases serve as precedents for the reso-
lution of future cases presenting the same or similar issues. The
doctrine that the Court promulgates in these cases and the
rationale for its decisions are applicable in future cases, where
that doctrine can be extended or limited. The meaning of a con-
stitutional provision thus develops incrementally over a period of
18. The Georgia "liberalized" abortion law was patterned after the
American Law Institute Model Penal Code, which served as the model for the
fourteen "liberalized" abortion laws that had been adopted at the time of Roe.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 (1985). See also the discussion in Roe, 410 U.S.
at 140-41. The Georgia law is set forth as Appendix A and the Model Penal
Code as Appendix B to the Doe v. Bolton opinion. See Doe, 410 U.S. at 202-07.
19. By the end of that year, Alaska, Hawaii and the State of Washington
also had repealed criminal penalties for abortions performed by a physician in
the early stages of pregnancy. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 140-141 n.37. With the
removal of all substantial legal restrictions on abortion in New York, middle-
class women, who could afford to travel to New York, were able to terminate
unwanted pregnancies by a safe and legal abortion. After 1970, the supply of
healthy newborns available for adoption began to decrease, since many
pregnant unmarried women were now able to obtain a safe and legal abortion.
20. At the time of Roe, 30 states, including Texas, had in effect laws that
prohibited an abortion except where necessary to save the life of the mother.
Fourteen states had "liberalized" abortion laws, and four states prohibited
abortion without restriction. The status of abortion was not clear in a few states.
See id. at 118 n.2, 138-40.
21. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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time, and the line of growth of that constitutional provision
strongly influences its application in particular cases.2 2
For the litigating lawyer, the "stuff of constitutional litiga-
tion" is the Supreme Court's precedents and the constitutional
doctrine that has been promulgated by the Court in prior cases.
In deciding whether or not to assert a constitutional challenge to
a particular law or governmental action, and in deciding on the
basis of that challenge, the lawyer must look to the precedents
and doctrine. This examination of precedents and doctrine will
determine the viability of a particular constitutional challenge
and the basis on which that challenge should be made.
As I have discussed more fully elsewhere,2 3 the development
of the constitutional protection of personal autonomy traces
back to the 1920's, where the Court used substantive due process
to invalidate laws interfering with parents' rights to control the
education of their children. 24 As part of this development, the
Court in 1942 decided Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson,25 in
which it invalidated on equal protection grounds an Oklahoma
law providing for the compulsory sterilization of persons who
had been convicted of three felonies involving moral turpitude,
but exempting "white-collar" crimes. In Skinner, the Court justi-
fied a higher level of scrutiny for the equal protection challenge
by saying that the compulsory sterilization requirement impli-
cated the fundamental rights of marriage and procreation
(which at that time were assumed to go together-only married
22. See generally Terrance Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH.
L. REv. 1033, 1054 (1981) (discussing the development of constitutional
doctrine in a line of growth); see also Robert A. Sedler, The Legitimacy Debate in
Constitutional Adjudication: An Assessment and a Different Perspective, 44 OHIO ST.
L.J. 93, 118-20 (1983).
23. See Robert A. Sedler, The Constitution and Personal Autonomy: The
Lawyering Perspective, 11 T.M. COOLEY L. REv. 773 (1994) [hereinafter Sedler,
Personal Autonomy]. This article was an expanded version of the Fifth Annual
Krinock Lecture that it was my privilege to deliver at the Thomas M. Cooley Law
School on November 23, 1993. A number of the points that I am now
discussing in connection with a woman's right to a safe and legal abortion were
first developed in that article.
24. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (invalidating a
state law requiring all parents to enroll their children only in private schools);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (invalidating a state law prohibiting the
teaching of schoolchildren in any language other than English and prohibiting
the teaching of any language at all to elementary schoolchildren). While
Justice Douglas in Griswold tried to explain these cases as First Amendment
cases, they were not decided as First Amendment cases, but were expressly
decided on due process grounds. The First Amendment realistically was not
available as a basis of challenge to state laws at the time these cases were
decided. See Sedler, Personal Autonomy, supra note 23, at 776-79.
25. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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persons were supposed to be procreating). Thus, in Skinner, the
Court recognized procreation-reproductive freedom-as a fun-
damental right, and while the Court had not yet specifically
articulated a two-tier standard of review, once it did, reproductive
freedom came within the category of "fundamental rights," inter-
ference with which would be tested under the compelling gov-
ernmental interest standard of review.26
Since Skinner had held that marriage and reproductive free-
dom were fundamental rights, Skinner served as a precedent for
the lawyers in Griswold to support their argument that the ban on
contraceptive use by married persons interfered with the funda-
mental right of married persons to engage in intimate marital
relationships without risking procreation-in essence that the
right to procreate also included the right to avoid procreation, so
that the right for constitutional purposes was a right of reproduc-
tive freedom.
In Griswold, the Court found the Connecticut ban on contra-
ceptive use by married couples unconstitutional as violating the
married couple's constitutional "right of privacy." However, only
two of the seven justices comprising the majority, Justices Harlan
and White, explicitly found this "right of privacy" to inhere in
substantive due process; the other opinions went off on "penum-
bras" and the Ninth Amendment.27 In Roe v. Wade, the Court
simply stated that the "right of privacy" was founded in the Four-
teenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty, 28 thereby in
effect adopting the Harlan-White due process analysis in Gris-
wold. In point of fact, as subsequent developments reflected in
the physician-assisted suicide opinion in Glucksberg make clear,
there is no generalized constitutional "right of privacy." Rather,
it is that certain privacy-type interests, such as marriage and
reproductive freedom, have been held to constitute fundamental
rights, while other privacy-type interests, such as sexual free-
dom,29 and physician-assisted suicide, have not. Once the Court
holds that the asserted "privacy-type" interest is not a fundamen-
tal right, the less demanding rational basis standard of review
applies, and the challenged restriction interfering with that inter-
est is likely to be upheld.
26. See Sedler, Personal Autonomy, supra note 23, at 780-82 (discussing
Skinner within the context of personal autonomy case law).
27. See id. at 782-83 (placing Griswold within the context of personal
autonomy case law).
28. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 110, 153 (1973).
29. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (sustaining the validity of
a Georgia statute prohibiting consensual sodomy).
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But regardless of the existence of any generalized constitu-
tional right of privacy, or the theoretical basis for the Court's
finding a "right of privacy" in Griswold, the significance of Gris-
wold for purposes of the constitutional challenge to anti-abortion
laws in the late 1960's was that in Griswold the Court had held
that there was a constitutional "right of privacy," and that repro-
ductive freedom was included within the ambit of that right. The
lawyers for the women claiming a constitutional right to a safe
and legal abortion could rely on Griswold as the source of consti-
tutional doctrine and precedent to support that challenge. If it
had not been for the Court's decision in Griswold, which inciden-
tally revived the vitality of the Skinner precedent, a viable constitu-
tional basis for challenging anti-abortion laws simply would not
have existed at that time.
My own involvement in the "Kentucky version" of Roe v.
Wade did not begin until 1970, well after most of the other chal-
lenges to state anti-abortion laws, including those that
culminated in Roe, had been litigated in the lower courts. So, I
had the benefit of the work that had been done by the lawyers
for the plaintiffs in those cases, as my opponents, including Ken-
tucky Right to Life, had the benefit of the work that had been
done by the opposing side. The essential argument for the plain-
tiffs was that abortion differed little from contraception and that
both procedures were related to implementation of a woman's
fundamental right of reproductive freedom. The argument went
on that since the constitutional "right of privacy" included repro-
ductive freedom, and since anti-abortion laws, which directly
interfered with that right, could not be justified under the exact-
ing compelling governmental interest standard of review, those
laws were unconstitutional. My own argument in the Kentucky
case focused on the virtually absolute ban of Kentucky's "life
only" anti-abortion law, and I argued that the law was unconstitu-
tional because it was "extreme," and did not allow an abortion in
at least some circumstances where an abortion was "medically
indicated," such as where it was necessary to protect the pregnant
woman's health.
The opposing argument was that abortion was very different
from contraception, because abortion "destroyed human life," so
that the state's interest in protecting human life "from the
moment of conception" justified a complete ban on abortion
except where it was necessary to protect the life of the mother.
In connection with this argument, it was argued, particularly by
Right to Life, that a fetus was a "person" for constitutional pur-
poses. If this argument had been accepted by the Court instead
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of being decisively rejected,3" not only would the laws prohibiting
abortion be constitutionally permissible, but laws permitting
abortion, such as New York's 1970 law, could be declared uncon-
stitutional as violating the "right to life" of the fetus.31 But totally
apart from whether a fetus was a "person" for constitutional pur-
poses, the state argued that anti-abortion laws could be sustained
as being necessary to advance the state's compelling interest in
protecting human life-even potential human life-from the
moment of conception.
After most of the lower court cases had been decided, but
the year before the Court decided Roe, it decided Eisenstadt v.
Baird,2 in which the Court clearly separated marriage from
reproductive freedom, and held that unmarried persons, like
married persons, also had a constitutionally protected right to
reproductive freedom. The Court did so in the context of invali-
dating a Massachusetts law that allowed only married couples to
have access to contraception when prescribed by a physician,
holding that as a matter of equal protection, unmarried persons
must have the same access to contraception as married persons,
because a ban on contraception interfered with their reproduc-
tive freedom.33
The stage was now set for what turned out to be the Court's
monumental decision in Roe. With the passage of time and now
somewhat removed from my advocacy perspective, I have said
that the Court, consistent with existing constitutional doctrine,
could have upheld the constitutionality of the challenged Texas
30. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 157-58. As the Court stated, "[b]ut in nearly all of
these instances [references to "person" in the Constitution], the use of the
word is such that it has application only postnatally. None indicates, with any
assurance, that it has any possible prenatal application .... [and] the word,
'person,' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn."
Id.
31. After the New York law permitting abortion was enacted in 1970, a
Fordham Law School professor brought an action in a state court, seeking to
have himself declared the guardian of all unborn fetuses in New York, and
seeking a declaration that the New York law was unconstitutional as violating
the "right to life" of the unborn fetus. His claim was rejected by the New York
state courts. See Byrn v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 286 N.E.2d 887
(N.Y. 1972), appeal dismissed, 410 U.S. 949 (1973).
32. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
33. The Court emphasized that the "right of privacy" recognized in
Griswold was an individual right, not the right of the married couple, and stated
that, "[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child." Id. at 453. For a discussion of this case at greater length, see
Sedler, Personal Autonomy, supra note 23, at 786-87.
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and Georgia anti-abortion laws. Applying the compelling govern-
mental interest standard of review, the Court could have held
that this interference with reproductive freedom could be justi-
fied even under that exacting standard. The Court could have
held that the state's interest in protecting potential human life
from the moment of conception was a compelling interest, and
that since a prohibition against abortion was the only effective
way of advancing that interest, it was necessarily the "least drastic
means" of doing so. 4
Instead, the Court, adopting a "stages of pregnancy" formu-
lation, which it retained in regard to the constitutional impermis-
sibility of abortion prohibition in Casey,35 held that the state's
interest in protecting potential human life did not become "com-
pelling" until the stage of viability had been reached, so that the
state could not constitutionally prohibit pre-viability abortions.
After the stage of viability had been reached, the state could pro-
hibit abortion except where the abortion was necessary to protect
the health of the mother.36 Since medical considerations dictate
that post-viability abortions not be performed unless this is neces-
sary to protect the woman's life or health (close to 90% of the
abortions in this country are performed during the first trimester
34. The Court could have distinguished Skinner, Griswold and Eisenstadt
on a constitutionally principled basis in that in those cases the particular
interference with reproductive freedom could not have been shown to be
rationally related to the advancement of any legitimate governmental interest,
let alone the least drastic means of advancing a compelling governmental
interest. See the discussion of these cases and how they could have been
distinguished by the lawyers for the state in Roe in Sedler, Personal Autonomy,
supra note 23, at 785-88.
35. The "central holding" of Roe was that the state could not prohibit an
abortion prior to viability. It was this "central holding" of Roe that the Court
reaffirmed in Casey. As the Court stated in Casey:
We have seen how' time has overtaken some of Roe's factual
assumptions: advances in maternal health care allow for abortions safe
to the mother later in pregnancy than was true in 1973, and advances
in neonatal care have advanced viability to a point somewhat earlier.
But these facts go only to the scheme of time limits on the realization
of competing interests, and the divergences from the factual premises
of 1973 have no bearing on the validity of Roe's central holding, that
viability marks the earliest point at which the State's interest in fetal
life is constitutionally adequate to justify a legislative ban on non-
therapeutic abortions.... Whenever it may occur, the attainment of
viability may continue to serve as the critical fact, just as it has done
since Roe was decided: which is to say that no change in Roe's factual
underpinning has left its central holding obsolete, and none supports
an argument for overruling it.
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 861 (1992) (citations omitted).
36. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 110, 162-65 (1973).
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of pregnancy), the practical effect of Roe was indeed to make
abortion "available on demand."
In holding that the state's interest in protecting potential
human life was not "compelling" until the stage of viability had
been reached, the Court was obviously engaging in constitutional
balancing. It was making a value judgment about the relative con-
stitutional importance of the woman's interest in reproductive free-
dom and the state's interest in protecting potential human life,
and it made that value judgment in favor of the woman's repro-
ductive freedom interest. In effect, the Court held that the
woman's reproductive freedom interest was constitutionally more
important than the state's interest in protecting potential human
life, in the context of state laws prohibiting pre-viability
abortions.
The Court's sweeping decision in Roe was a complete sur-
prise to me and I strongly suspect to many of the most ardent
advocates of a woman's right to reproductive freedom. The
sweeping nature of that decision was inconsistent with the princi-
ple that a constitutional decision should not be rendered "in
broader terms than are required by the precise facts to which the
ruling is to be applied."37 The lawyers who were asserting the
constitutional challenges in these cases were primarily concerned
with striking down the draconian "life only" Texas law and the
still highly restrictive Georgia law that allowed abortion only in
limited circumstances and with a number of restrictions.3" All
that the Court had to decide in Roe was that these kinds of laws
constituted an improper interference with a woman's fundamen-
tal right of reproductive freedom. Instead, the Court came down
with this sweeping decision, invalidating all the anti-abortion laws
then in existence, as well as any other law that would prohibit a
woman from having a pre-viability abortion, and also imposing
significant constitutional restrictions on a state's efforts to regu-
late the abortion procedure. It was a complete and unexpected
victory for advocates of a woman's reproductive freedom.
Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has criticized
the Court's decision in Roe not only for going beyond invalidat-
ing the challenged laws in issue and "fashion [ing] a set of rules
that displaced virtually every state law then in force," but also for
not focusing sufficiently on the impact that anti-abortion laws
37. Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 569 (1947).
38. As I said, my essential argument in the Kentucky case was that
Kentucky's "life only" law was unconstitutional because it was "extreme" and did
not allow for an abortion at least in some circumstances where an abortion was
"medically indicated," such as where necessary to protect a woman's health.
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had on the "ability [of a woman] to control her [own
destiny] . .. and her ability... to participate equally in the eco-
nomic and social life of the Nation," a focus that she found in the
Court's decision in Casey. 9 Justice Ginsburg concludes that
"l[t] he Roe decision might have been less of a storm center had it
both honed in more precisely on the woman's equality dimen-
sion of the issue and, correspondingly, attempted nothing more
bold at that time than the mode of decisionmaking the Court
employed in the 1970's gender classification cases."4 ° In those
cases, a number of which were litigated by Justice Ginsburg her-
self as she was developing the constitutional protection of gender
equality under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause, the Court proceeded on a case by case basis. The Court
invalidated all of the traditional gender-based classifications that
had disadvantaged women, and also invalidated gender-based
classifications disadvantaging men, except where the classifica-
tion could be shown to be substantially related to overcoming the
present consequences of past discrimination against women as a
group.41
Given the extent of opposition to Roe by the pro-life move-
ment, I seriously doubt that the decision would have been any
"less of a storm center" if it had been limited to invalidating the
challenged anti-abortion laws in issue. I also doubt that the deci-
sion would have been any less opposed by the pro-life movement
if it had "honed in more precisely on the woman's equality
dimension of the issue." The pro-life movement strongly dis-
putes the contention that a concern for women's equality justi-
fies a woman's "destruction of the life of her unborn child." Be
that as it may, Justice Ginsburg is clearly correct in emphasizing
that, as the Court recognized in Casey, the social and political
context in which Roe was litigated was the context of women's
equality. As we have said, the 1960's saw the emergence of the
women's rights movement, and in the forefront of this move-
ment was the assertion of a woman's right to control over her
own body, and to terminate an unwanted pregnancy by a safe
and legal abortion. It is this right that the Supreme Court
39. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1185, 1199-2000 (1992) (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
856 (1992)).
40. Id. at 2000.
41. SeeJOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 772-
90 (5th ed. 1995) (analyzing and discussing cases involving gender-based
classifications).
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emphatically recognized in Roe and effectively made abortion
"available on demand. '4 2
However, while the social and political context in which Roe
was litigated was indeed a context of women's equality, the legal
context in which Roe was litigated was a context of personal
autonomy and reproductive freedom, rather than a legal context
of women's equality. The right of a woman to reproductive free-
dom was involved in Roe simply because of the biological fact that
only women can become pregnant and so are in need of a safe
and legal abortion in order to terminate an unwanted preg-
nancy. But the doctrinal basis of the challenge to anti-abortion
laws in Roe was the interference with the woman's right to repro-
ductive freedom, and the precedents supporting that challenge
were the reproductive freedom precedents of Skinner, Griswold
and Eisenstadt, precedents that involved the reproductive free-
dom of both men and women. Thus, the fact that anti-abortion
laws impacted only on women and so "interfered with [her] abil-
ity to control her own destiny and to participate equally in the
economic and social life of the Nation" was logically and doctri-
nally irrelevant to the basis of the constitutional challenge in
Roe.43
42. A woman's constitutional right of reproductive freedom also includes
her right not to be compelled to have an abortion. Thus, just as the state
cannot give parents the power to prevent their minor daughter from having an
abortion, the state cannot give parents the power to compel their minor
daughter to have an abortion either. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52 (1976).
The government's effort to compel a woman to have an abortion against
her will was at issue in Struck v. Secretary of Defense, 460 F.2d 1372 (9th Cir. 1971),
cert. granted, 409 U.S. 942, vacated, 409 U.S. 947 (1972). Captain Struck was an
Air Force career officer who became pregnant in Vietnam. Her religious views
precluded her from having an abortion. She declared her intention to place
her child for adoption immediately after birth, and did so. At the time, Air
Force regulations required the discharge of any woman officer who became
pregnant. Roe v. Wade had not yet been decided, and while Captain Struck
asserted a reproductive freedom challenge, her primary challenge was based on
"Fifth Amendment equal protection," focusing on the discrimination between
male officers who became fathers, and female officers who became mothers,
and between female officers who chose to have an abortion and female officers
who chose to continue their pregnancy. Captain Struck's constitutional
challenge was rejected by the lower courts, but after the Supreme Court
granted certiorari, the Air Force backed off and permitted her to remain in the
service.
43. As to why it would not have been doctrinally possible to mount a
gender discrimination challenge to anti-abortion laws in the 1960's and as to
why such a challenge would not have been as effective as a challenge based on
the interference with reproductive freedom, see Sedler, Personal Autonomy, supra
note 23, at 794-96.
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The primary significance of Casey in regard to a woman's
constitutional right to a safe and legal abortion is that the Court,
although badly divided and only by a single vote, reaffirmed the
"central holding" of Roe, that the state may not prohibit a woman
from having an abortion until the stage of viability has been
reached." Although the Court doctrinally replaced the "stages
of pregnancy" formulation of Roe with the "undue burden" for-
mulation45 that had long been advocated by Justice O'Connor,4 6
the practical effect of this doctrinal change is only to permit the
state to impose "harassing-type" regulations that had been held
unconstitutional under Roe and other pre-Casey cases, such as a
twenty-four hour wait and state-required information designed to
discourage the woman from having an abortion.
The existence of "harassing-type" regulations and otheri reg-
ulations of the abortion procedure, such as a ban on so-called
"partial birth" abortions, is peripheral to recognition of a woman's
constitutional right to a safe and legal abortion. While the pro-
choice and the pro-life forces portray every controversy over the
enactment of abortion regulation as a titanic struggle for a
woman's freedom of choice or for the right to life of the unborn
child, the fact remains that no abortion regulation, "harassing"
or otherwise, will have the effect of denying a woman the right to
have a safe and legal abortion. If the woman has to wait twenty-
four hours before having the abortion, this means a second trip
to the doctor's office, which, while inconvenient, does not pre-
vent her from having the abortion when she gets there. If a phy-
44. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860-61, 878-79 (1992).
45. In Casey, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter promulgated this
test in a joint opinion. The joint opinion was joined in by Justices Blackmun
and Stevens, who favored retention of the "stages of pregnancy" test, in order to
keep intact what the joint opinion called the "central holding" of Roe, that the
state cannot prohibit pre-viability abortions. In any event, where five Justices
join in the judgment, but differ in their reasons for doing so, the holding of the
Court is based on the narrowest ground of agreement among the Justices who
joined in the judgment. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
Since the "undue burden" formulation is narrower than the "stages of
pregnancy" formulation, it becomes the basis for the holding that the state
cannot prohibit pre-viability abortions. The "undue burden" formulation was
also the basis for the Court's holding that the spousal notification requirement
was unconstitutional, as well as for the Court's holding that the other regulatory
provisions of the challenged law were constitutionally permissible. The four
dissenting Justices would have upheld all the regulatory provisions on the same
basis as they would have upheld a pre-viability prohibition on abortion-that a
woman does not have a constitutionally protected right to a safe and legal
abortion.
46. See Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 452-66
(1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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sician cannot use a so-called "partial birth" abortion to perform a
medically-indicated abortion late in the pregnancy, the physician
can use a different procedure, and the medically-indicated abor-
tion will be performed. I do not wish to minimize the signifi-
cance of abortion regulations and the legitimate concerns of
both the pro-choice and the pro-life forces in this area. My point
is that the constitutional right of a woman to have a safe and
legal abortion is firmly established, and no kind of abortion regu-
lation can prevent her from exercising that right.
47
This brings me finally to the societal impact of the Supreme
Court's decisions in Roe and Casey recognizing a constitutional
right to a safe and legal abortion. The societal impact of these
decisions is that abortion is now operationally acceptable in Ameri-
can society. Despite the public controversy over abortion and the
unremitting opposition to abortion by the pro-life forces, the
availability of safe and legal abortions for women who wish to
have them has become a permanent feature of American life.
There is now an "abortion industry," and most of the nearly 90%
of abortions that are performed in the first trimester of preg-
nancy4s are performed in abortion clinics. Well over a million
abortions are performed each year, and while there has been a
slight drop in abortions in recent years, according to the Center
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), in 1994, a total of
1,267,415 legal abortions were reported to the CDC, down from
about 1.3 million in 1993. The statistics showed that in 1994
there were 321 abortions per 1,000 live births, and that twenty-
47. The most serious interference with a woman's right to have a safe and
legal abortion is the denial of public funding for abortions for indigent women,
which the Supreme Court has long held is constitutionally permissible. See
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). I
seriously doubt, however, that most indigent women who want to terminate an
unwanted pregnancy are in practice prevented from doing so by the absence of
public funding. Rather, these women and their families are likely somehow to
come up with the money to pay for the abortion, even if this means that they
must suffer further economic deprivation, and it may be that non-profit
abortion providers, such as Planned Parenthood, have taken actions to facilitate
the provision of abortions for indigent women. I do not have any sense that at
the present time most indigent women who want to have an abortion are in
practice unable to obtain it.
48. According to the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC),
in 1994, the last year for which statistics are available, about 54% of abortions
were performed during the first eight weeks of pregnancy, and about 88% were
performed during the first twelve weeks. See generally AMERICAN POLITICAL
NETWORK, ABORTION REPORT (1997).
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one of every 1000 women ages fifteen to forty-four had an abor-
tion in 1994.49
The primary reason why so many abortions are being per-
formed in the United States today is contraceptive failure. A sur-
vey of 10,000 abortion patients in 1994-95 conducted by the Alan
Guttmacher Institute found that 57.5% of the women who had
abortions were using contraception during the month in which
they became pregnant, up from 51.3% who answered a similar
question in the late 1980's. According to the Institute's Presi-
dent, "Our study clearly shows that the large majority of women
are motivated to prevent an unwanted pregnancy and avoid abor-
tion in the first place.
5 °
The survey also exploded the myth that most abortion
patients are low-income patients. Although the Institute said that
abortion rates are relatively high for teenagers and those with low
incomes, 78.5% of the abortion patients were over age twenty,
and 45.6% were over age twenty-four. More than half of the
abortion patients reported annual family incomes higher than
$30,000.51 The final point that the survey made was that abor-
tion was more widespread than generally believed and that even
women who belong to groups traditionally opposed to abortion
are likely to seek abortions. The survey found that one in every
five abortion patients were evangelical or born-again Christians,
and that Catholic women actually had a slightly higher abortion
rate than their representation in the population as a whole:
31.3% of the abortion patients surveyed gave their religion as
Roman Catholic, although Roman Catholics account for 30.9%
of the United States childbearing population. The Institute esti-
mated that half of all American women are likely to have an abor-
tion at some point during their lives.52
49. See id. The thrust of the news story was that the 1994 abortion rate
was the lowest since 1976, when there was 312 abortions per 1,000 live births.
The operational acceptance of abortion in American society today is illustrated
by the fact that it is newsworthy that the abortion rate is dropping slightly from
1.3 million abortions per year, and that with this drop, there were still 321
abortions per 1,000 live births.
In 1995, 1,210,883 abortions were reported to the Center. In 1996, the
number was 1,221,585. The number of abortions had peaked in 1990 at
1,429,577. In 1996, the rate of abortions per 1000 women ages fifteen to forty-
four had declined to 20 from 21 in 1994. See Tamar Levin, Slight Increase in
Abortions Reported, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1998, at 21.
50. U.S. Abortion Survey Produces Surprise Statistics, THE LANCET, Aug. 17,
1996, at 469.
51. See id.
52. See id. A New York Times-CBS News poll taken in connection with the
25th anniversary of the Roe v. Wade decision showed strong public acceptance of
a woman's right to have an abortion during the first three months of
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The widespread prevalence of abortion in American society
in the 1990's was not something that was anticipated by myself
and the other abortion rights advocates that I knew at the time of
Roe. As I said at the time, none of us-the physicians who wanted
to perform abortions, the women who wanted to have a constitu-
tional right to a safe and legal abortion, the lawyers who litigated
the cases-"liked" abortion. We all recognized that abortion
interrupted a viable pregnancy: in the great majority of cases, the
pregnancy will not "spontaneously abort," and so will result in a
life birth. By interrupting the viable pregnancy and preventing
the eventual life birth, abortion did amount to the destruction of
potential human life, and none of us denied this. For this and
other reasons, it was assumed that abortion would be stressful for
the woman, and physicians performing abortions were expected
to provide counseling for their patients, both about accepting
their decision to have an abortion and about preventing an abor-
tion in the future by the proper use of contraception. We saw
abortion as a temporary expedient that would be largely unnec-
essary after the pharmaceutical industry developed a contracep-
tive that was safe, effective, acceptable and available. We did not
anticipate that a quarter of a century later, well over a million
abortions would be performed each year.
But this contraceptive was not developed. There are
problems and side effects with every kind of contraceptive use,
and all too often contraception fails or is not used at all. Thus,
abortion, which we saw as a temporary expedient, has now
become a permanent expedient to deal with unwanted preg-
nancy caused by contraceptive failure. The Supreme Court has
held that the Constitution recognizes a woman's right to a safe
and legal abortion, and the societal impact of this decision, cou-
pled with continuing contraceptive failure, is that women exer-
cise this right in large numbers in American society today.
Abortion then is an accepted feature of American life today, and
this is because the Supreme Court held a quarter of a century
ago that a woman has a constitutional right to a safe and legal
abortion.
pregnancy, but equally strong resistance to her having an abortion after that
time. The survey showed that the respondents supported a woman's right to
have an abortion during the first three months of pregnancy by 61 percent to
28 percent, but opposed her having that right during the second three months
by 66 percent to 15 percent and during the third three months by 79 percent to
7 percent. See Carey Goldberg & Janet Elder, Public Still Backs Abortion, But
Wants Limits, Poll Says, N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 16, 1998, at 1. As pointed out previously,
close to 90 percent of abortions in the United States are performed during the
first trimester of pregnancy.
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THE REJECTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
PHYSICIAN-AssISTED SUICIDE
In the companion cases of Washington v. Glucksberg3 and
Vacco v. Quill,5 4 the Supreme Court has unanimously held that
the Constitution does not recognize as a "fundamental right" the
asserted right to "commit suicide" and to have assistance in doing
SO. This includes the asserted right of a terminally ill person, in
the end stages of that person's terminal illness, to make the
choice to hasten inevitable death by the use of physician-pre-
scribed medications.56 Since no fundamental right was impli-
cated by bans on physician-assisted suicide, the rational basis
standard applied, and under that standard, the state's ban on
physician-assisted suicide was found to be rationally related to the
advancement of "unquestionably important and legitimate inter-
ests."5 7 The Supreme Court then has definitively determined
that there is no constitutional right to physician-assisted
suicide.58
53. 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
54. 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
55. See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2271.
56. See id. at 2262. The plaintiffs in Glucksberg and Vacco were not
asserting a general right to "commit suicide," but only the right of the
terminally ill, in the end stages of their terminal illness, to make the choice to
hasten inevitable death. See id.; see also Sedler, Constitutional Challenges, supra
note 2, at 793-94.
57. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct at 2275.
58. Glucksberg was the more important case, since it directly presented the
issue of whether, as the Ninth Circuit had held, the Due Process Clause protects
as a fundamental right, the right of terminally ill persons, in the end stages of
their terminal illness, to make the choice to hasten inevitable death by the use
of physician-prescribed medications. In Vacco, the Second Circuit rejected the
contention that the right of the terminally ill to make the choice to hasten
inevitable death was a fundamental right for constitutional purposes, and rested
its decision on an equal protection ground that had not specifically been
argued by the plaintiffs in that case. The plaintiffs had argued, on the
assumption that the right of the terminally ill to make the choice to hasten
inevitable death was a fundamental right, that the New York ban on physician-
assisted suicide also violated equal protection in that it improperly
distinguished between terminally patients who were permitted to choose to
hasten inevitable death by refusing or withdrawing life-saving medical
treatment and those who were not permitted to make that choice by the use of
physician-prescribed medications. The Second Circuit held that this distinction
failed the rational basis standard of review. In Vacco, the Supreme Court, to the
contrary, held that the distinction was a rational one as "comport[ing] with
fundamental legal principles of causation and intent," and that New York's ban
on physician-assisted suicide was rationally related to the advancement of the
legitimate state interests that the Court identified in Glucksberg. Vacco, 117 S. Ct.
at 2298-2302. Since Glucksberg turned out to be the more important case, we
will refer to it as including both decisions in the same way as we have referred to
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Like the constitutional challenges to legal prohibitions on
abortion that culminated in Roe v. Wade, the constitutional chal-
lenge to legal prohibitions on physician-assisted suicide that
culminated in Glucksberg is best understood in terms of legal,
social and political context. Let us look first to the social context
in which this challenge arose. The social context is best
described as a conflict between the wishes of terminally ill people
to be free from pain and to "die with dignity" and the traditional
insistence of the organized medical' profession that its responsi-
bility was to keep people alive at all costs, coupled with a general
disinterest in "death and dying" and in providing palliative care
for the terminally ill. In other words, the terminally ill have too
often suffered from both overtreatment and undertreatment.
The overtreatment takes the form of medical efforts to keep
them alive at all costs, and the undertreatment takes the form of
failing to deal adequately with their pain and with their anxiety
about death. In graphic terms, terminally ill people, in the end
stages of their terminal illness, have all too often found them-
selves "hooked up to machines" that keep them alive, while their
physicians refuse to prescribe adequate pain medication for fear
that "too much medication will kill them.
59
A recent Report of the Institute of Medicine has analyzed at
length the twin problems of overtreatment and undertreatment
and the general disinterest of the medical profession in "death
and dying."6" A number of the observations in the Report make
it clear why terminally ill people have asserted a constitutional
right to physician-assisted suicide. We will set out just a few:
[T]oo many people suffer needlessly at the end of life,
both from errors of omission (when caregivers fail to pro-
vide palliative and supportive care known to be effective)
and from errors of commission (when caregivers do what is
known to be ineffective and even harmful). Studies have
repeatedly indicated that a significant proportion of dying
patients and patients with advanced disease experience
serious pain, despite the availability of effective and other
options for relieving most pain .... In perverse counter-
Roe v. Wade as including the Court's decision in the companion case of Doe v.
Bolton.
59. My wife, Rozanne Sedler, M.S.W., is a geriatric social worker who has
helped me very much in understanding the social context of physician-assisted
suicide. As she has put it succinctly: "Old people want an easy exit. They don't
want to be kept alive and suffer great pain. They just want to die in peace."
60. See generally DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE SERVICES, INSTITUTE OF
MEDICINE, APPROACHING DEATH: IMPROVING CARE AT THE END OF LIFE (Marilyn J.
Field & Christine K Cassel eds., 1997) [hereinafter APPROACHING DEATH].
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point to the problem of undertreatment, the aggressive use
of ineffectual and intrusive interventions may prolong and
even dishonor the period of dying .... 61
Outdated and scientifically-flawed drug-prescribing laws,
regulations, and interpretations by state medical boards
continue to frustrate and intimidate physicians who wish to
relieve their patients' pain. Addiction to opiods appropri-
ately prescribed to relieve pain and other symptoms is vir-
tually nonexistent, whereas underuse of those medications
is a well-documented problem.
62
[T]he education of physicians and other health care pro-
fessionals fails to provide them with the attitudes, knowl-
edge, and skills required to care well for the dying patient.
Many deficiencies in practice stem from fundamental prior
failures in professional education. Undergraduate, gradu-
ate and continuing education do not sufficiently prepare
health professionals to recognize the final phases of ill-
nesses, understand and manage their own emotional reac-
tions to death and dying, construct effective strategies for
care, and communicate sensitively with patients and those
close to them.6
3
It is a dual perversity that interest in assisted suicide some-
times reflects anxiety about overly aggressive medical treat-
ment, sometimes dread about abandonment, and
sometimes fear that dying people may suffer simultane-
ously or sequentially from both misfortunes.64
61. APPROACHING DEAT, supra note 60, at Sum-4.
62. Id. The Report goes on to point out that "[n]umerous studies
indicate that dying patients and patients with advanced illnesses experience
considerable amounts of pain and other physical and psychological symptoms."
Id. at 5-6.
63. Id at Sum-5. As the Report went on to observe "[d]eficiencies in
undergraduate, graduate and continuing education for end-of-life care reflect a
medical culture that defines death as failure and ignores care for dying people
as a source of professional accomplishment and personal meaning." Id. at 8-1.
The Report concluded that health professions education can do better in
(1) conferring a basic level of competence in the care of the dying
patient for all practitioners; (2) developing an expected level of
palliative and humanistic skills considerably beyond this basic level;
and (3) establishing a cadre of superlative professionals to develop
and provide exemplary care for those approaching death, to guide
others in the delivery of such care, and to generate new knowledge to
improve care of the dying.
Id. at 8-2. Chapter 8 of the Report, entitled Educating Clinicians and OtherProfes-
sionals, puts much emphasis on this problem.
64. Id. at 1-2. The Report also observed that:
[i]n the context of end-of-life care, overtreatment involves both care
that is clinically inappropriate and care that is not wanted by the
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[P]eople in this country have not yet discovered how to
talk realistically but comfortably about the end of life, nor
have they learned how to value the period of dying as it is
now experienced by most people . . . . One result is an
unhelpful combination of fear, misinformation, and over-
simplification that contributes to a public perception of
misery as inescapable, pain as unavoidable, and public
spending as misdirected for people approaching death.6 5
[A] good death is one that is: free from avoidable distress
and suffering for patients, families and caregivers; in gen-
eral accord with patients' and families' wishes; and reason-
ably consistent with clinical, cultural, and ethical standards.
A bad death, in turn, is characterized by needless suffering,
dishonoring of patient or family wishes or values, and a
sense among participants or observers that norms of
decency have been offended. Bad deaths include those
resulting from or accompanied by neglect, violence, or
unwanted and senseless medical treatments.
66
The desire of many terminally ill persons to have a "good death"
and to avoid a "bad death" was a major factor behind the devel-
opment of constitutional challenges to bans on assisted suicide.
Another major factor behind the development of constitu-
tional challenges to bans on assisted suicide, as it turned out, was
the widely-publicized activity of Dr. Jack Kevorkian in assisting
terminally ill persons and other persons in great pain to end
their lives. Dr. Kevorkian has a very clear philosophy of death
related to an individual's control of his or her own destiny.
Kevorkian's focus has been on an individual's right to be liber-
ated from unbearable pain and suffering and the right to end "a
life no longer worth living" because of the effects of debilitating
illness. Given this focus, some of the persons that Dr. Kevorkian
has assisted in ending their lives have not been terminally ill, and
Dr. Kevorkian's constitutional defense to prosecutions in Michi-
gan has been based on an asserted constitutional right of his
patients to be free from unbearable pain and suffering. It may
also be noted that Dr. Kevorkian has provided assistance in end-
ing their lives to only a very few persons-somewhere between 50
patient, even if some clinical benefit might be expected. Fear of
unwanted treatment at the end of life is an important factor in
initiatives promoting advance care planning. Such fear-and the loss
of control it implies-may also contribute to interest in assisted
suicide.
Id. at 5-13 (citations omitted).
65. Id. at 1-2.
66. Id. at 1-8.
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and 100 6 7-out of the thousands who have sought that
assistance.6 8
Because Dr. Kevorkian's activity in assisting suffering people
to end their lives has been so visible and because he has been a
such strong advocate for physician-assisted suicide, the matter of
"death with dignity" came to public attention in a way that it had
never done before. This was not a situation like that presented
in the Quinlan69 and Cruzan7 ° cases, where the question involved
the ending of artificial life support for a person in a persistent
vegetative state. Now it was competent adults who had made the
deliberate choice to end their lives, and Dr. Kevorkian was using
his skills as a physician to enable them to do so. American soci-
ety was now forced to come to grips with the policy question of
whether physician-assisted suicide should be permissible in that
society.
For some years before Kevorkian came on the scene, various
groups had been advocating for legal recognition of a person's
right to make the decision to end life and to have the assistance
of a physician in carrying out that decision. Fueled in part by
public awareness of the issue in the early 1990's, proponents suc-
ceeded in getting initiatives authorizing assisted suicide in speci-
fied circumstances on the ballot in California, Washington and
67. Dr. Kevorkian has acknowledged assisting in 50 suicides, but his
attorney, Geoffrey Fieger, has said that other cases, not made public, push the
total closer to 100. See Note Found Near Body Mentions Kevorkian, DET. FREE PRESS,
Oct. 4, 1997, at 11.
68. Dr. Kevorkian's activities, and those of his associate, Janet Good, have
been chronicled by Jack Lessenberry, a free-lance writer and journalism
instructor at Wayne State University. See, e.g., Jack Lessenberry, Death Becomes
Him, VANrrv FAIR, July 1994, at 105; Jack Lessenberry, Death and the Matron,
ESQUIRE, Apr. 1997, at 80. A highly critical assessment of Dr. Kevorkian is found
in Michael Betzold, NEw REPUBLIC, May 26,1997, at 22.
A personal disclaimer is necessary. I am not an "objective observer" about
Dr. Kevorkian. In the process of litigating the Michigan ACLU's challenge to
Michigan's ban on assisted suicide and commenting extensively on the matter
both in Michigan and the national media, I have come to know Dr. Kevorkian
and his attorneys, Geoffrey Fieger and Michael Schwartz, very well. Jack
Lessenberry is also a personal friend. I have high regard for Dr. Kevorkian's
commitment to the cause that he has so strongly advocated and respect for him
as an individual. So does my wife, who is more directly involved with issues of
death and dying than I am. I also have high regard for the legal abilities of Mr.
Fieger and Mr. Schwartz, and for the journalistic ability of Mr. Lessenberry.
Stated simply, I "am at one" with all of them, and some of my observations are
based on personal knowledge. As stated in the title of the article, this article is
written "from within," and the "within" part includes my involvement with "the
Kevorkian circle."
69. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (NJ. 1976).
70. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
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Oregon. The voting was very close in all three states, with the
initiatives failing in California and Washington, and narrowly
passing in Oregon.71 As the ballot initiatives indicate, the polit-
ical context in which the constitutional challenge to bans on
assisted suicide was litigated was one of extreme controversy.
Although public opinion surveys show support for the general
proposition that in some circumstances persons should be able
to end their life with the assistance of a physician, 72 there is great
disagreement on what these circumstances should be and on the
conditions in which physician-assisted suicide should be permit-
ted. And as will be discussed subsequently, the opponents of
physician-assisted suicide have marshaled very credible argu-
ments about the dangers of abuse and about the "slippery slope"
that would follow from legal recognition of physician-assisted
suicide.
Because the matter of physician-assisted suicide is so politi-
cally controversial, there is understandably considerable legisla-
tive resistance to confronting it. Most of the states have long-
standing prohibitions against assisted suicide, which reflected a
policy against assisting in the taking of a human life.7 3 Prosecu-
tions under these laws have been exceedingly rare. While these
laws for the most part were not enacted to deal specifically with
physician-assisted suicide, by their terms they are necessarily
applicable to physician-assisted suicide, and can be invoked
against it. And insofar as legislatures are disposed to act, it is to
prohibit physician-assisted suicide, as some states have done in
recent years. No proposal to permit physician-assisted suicide
has passed in any legislature. 4
It is in this social and political context that constitutional
challenges to bans on assisted suicide have been asserted. Com-
passion in Dying, an organization "dedicated to changing the cli-
mate and experience of dying in America, to allow mentally
competent patients to experience a choice in the manner of
their dying,"75 brought the challenges to the Washington and
71. See the discussion of the ballot initiatives in Washington v. Glucksberg,
117 S. Ct. 2258, 2266 (1997). The Oregon law did not go into effect because of
legal challenges, and a proposal to repeal it on the ballot for the November,
1997 election. See Carey Goldberg, Oregon Braces for New Fight on Helping the
Dying to Die, N.Y. TIMEs, June 17, 1997, at 1.
72. Survey research on attitudes toward death and dying is summarized in
APPROACHING DEATH, supra note 60, at 2-11-13.
73. A list of state laws prohibiting assisted suicide is set forth in Glucksberg,
117 S. Ct. at 2287 n.14.
74. See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2266.
75. Letter from Kathryn L. Tucker, Director of Legal Affairs, Compassion
in Dying, to Robert A. Sedler, Professor of Law, Wayne State University (Oct. 8,
552 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 12
New York laws that culminated in Glucksberg and Vacco. Dr.
Kevorkian's activity prompted the enactment of a ban on assisted
suicide in Michigan, one of the few states that did not have an
extant law, and led to the unsuccessful constitutional challenge
to that ban that I litigated for the Michigan ACLU in the Michi-
gan state courts.76
The primary constitutional argument that was made both by
Compassion in Dying and the by Michigan ACLU 77 was that the
right of the terminally ill, in the end stages of their terminal ill-
ness, to make the choice to hasten inevitable death, was a "funda-
mental right," protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause, and that an absolute ban on physician assistance
imposed an "undue burden" on that right, which could not be
justified under the compelling governmental interest standard of
review.7' There were two doctrinal bases to this argument. The
first basis involved what we contended was a "logical extension"
of the assumed constitutional right to refuse or discontinue life-
1997) (on file with author). Ms. Tucker was lead counsel in the Glucksberg and
Vacco cases from their inception and argued Glucksberg before the Supreme
Court. Ms. Tucker goes on to say in her letter:
Our chief mission has always been to provide information,
consultation and emotional support to terminally ill patients and their
families who are facing end of life choices. We offer consultations
regarding every end-of-life option, including pain management,
palliation and hospice care. For mentally competent people who
make an enduring and voluntary request, we also provide information
about hastening death when suffering cannot be adequately
addressed.
Id.
Compassion in Dying, as might be expected, also seeks to "change the law
to improve care of the dying and to allow physicians to participate fully and
openly in a hastened death." Id. It has "made a long term commitment to the
legal work necessary to bring the laws on assisted dying into accord with current
needs." Id; see also Kathryn L. Tucker, The Death With Dignity Movement: Protecting
Rights and Expanding Options After Glucksberg and Quill, 82 MINN L. REv. 923
(1998).
76. The ACLU challenge, Hobbins v. Attorney-General, was decided with
and reported as People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 714 (1995).
77. Counsel for Compassion in Dying, Kathryn L. Tucker, and myself
shared our arguments and cooperated with each other. While we developed
our cases separately, and while the cases took different turns in the lower
courts, our primary constitutional argument was essentially the same.
78. The argument, as I developed it in Hobbins, is set forth in Sedler,
Constitutional Challenges, supra note 2, at 780-90. As noted above, it was
essentially the same argument as was made by counsel for Compassion in Dying
in litigating the Glucksberg and Vacco cases.
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saving medical treatment that had been recognized in Cruzan.79
This doctrinal basis of the argument was similar to the "abortion
as a logical extension of contraception" argument that had been
advanced in Roe. since abortion differed little from contraception
and since both procedures were related to implementation of a
woman's fundamental right to reproductive freedom, the consti-
tutional right to reproductive freedom included the right to a
safe and legal abortion. In regard to physician-assisted suicide,
the argument was that since there was no essential difference
between ending life by refusing or discontinuing life-saving medi-
cal treatment and ending life by the use of physician-prescribed
medications, the right of the terminally ill, in the end stages of
their terminal illness, to hasten inevitable death, should be given
the same constitutional protection as the right to refuse or dis-
continue lifesaving medical treatment.
The second doctrinal basis of the argument looked to the
broad definition of "liberty" in Casey, and contended that, under
that definition, the right of the terminally ill, in the end stages of
their terminal illness, to make the choice to hasten inevitable
death, like the right of a woman to have a pre-viability abortion,
qualified as a "fundamental right" for constitutional purposes.
In Casey, the Supreme Court had stated:
It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of
personal liberty which the government may not
enter .... It is settled now ... that the Constitution places
limits on a State's right to interfere with a person's most
basic decisions about family and parenthood, as well as
bodily integrity .... At the heart of liberty is the right to
define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about
these matters could not define the attributes of per-
sonhood were they formed under compulsion of the
State.8 0
79. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). Chief
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court stated that "we assume that the United
States Constitution would grant a competent person a constitutionally
protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition." Id. at 279. In her
separate opinion in Cruzan, Justice O'Connor fully developed the reasons why
the right of a person to refuse life-saving medical treatment is encompassed
within the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause. As she stated: "The liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause must
protect, if it protects anything, an individual's deeply personal decision to reject
medical treatment, including the artificial delivery of food and water." Id. at
289 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
80. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
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The argument attempted to bring the decision to hasten inevita-
ble death within the ambit of Casey's broad definition of "liberty"
and to liken that decision to other decisions about personal
autonomy that the Court had heretofore recognized as "funda-
mental rights." The argument, as I developed it in Hobbins, was
as follows:
A person's entitlement to bodily integrity and control over
that person's own body protects the person's right to
refuse unwanted medical treatment, including the right of
a competent adult person to make the personal decision to
discontinue lifesaving medical treatment. It protects the
right of a woman to have an abortion and the right of men
and women to use contraception in order to prevent preg-
nancy. For the same reasons, a terminally ill person's right
to control that person's own body must include the right to
make decisions about the voluntary termination of that
person's life. Terminally ill persons must have the right to
make the 'most basic decisions about ... bodily integrity,'
'the right to define [their] own concept of existence,' and
'the attributes of their personhood,' without the 'compul-
sion of the [s]tate.' Thus, logically, they must have the
right to decide whether to undergo unbearable suffering
until death comes naturally, or to hasten their inevitable
death by the use of physician-prescribed medications."1
Once it was established that the right to make the choice to
hasten inevitable death was a "fundamental right," the argument
went on, it could not be denied that an absolute ban on the use
of physician-prescribed medications to hasten death was an
"undue burden" on that right, which could not be justified under
the exacting compelling governmental interest standard of
review.8
2
It was clear during the litigation as it certainly is clear in ret-
rospect that the success of the constitutional challenge depended
on the Court's acceptance of the argument that the right of ter-
minally ill persons, in the end stages of their terminal illness, to
make the choice to hasten inevitable death was a "fundamental
right" for constitutional purposes. If the Court were to hold, as it
ultimately did, that this was not a "fundamental right," then the
various interests asserted by the state to justify the absolute ban,
such as "preserving life" and avoiding possible abuse and "slip-
pery slope" problems, would be sufficient to sustain its constitu-
tionality under the rational basis standard of review. But if the
81. Sedler, Constitutional Challenges, supra note 2, at 787.
82. Id. at 789.
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Court had held that this was a "fundamental right," then the
absolute ban on physician-assistance, which imposed an "undue
burden" on that right, could not be shown to be precisely tai-
lored to advance a compelling governmental interest.
The structural problem with this argument was that its
acceptance by the Court would have required the Court to recog-
nize specifically a new fundamental right, which the Court had
been unwilling to do for some twenty years. The last time the
Court found a fundamental right that it had not expressly recog-
nized previously was in Moore v. City of East Cleveland,83 where it
held that extended family relationships were included in the pre-
viously-recognized fundamental right of marriage and the family.
The Court has rejected the contention that sexual freedom was a
fundamental right,84 and in the context of equal protection chal-
lenges to legislative classifications, had held that neither educa-
tion8 5 nor housing86 was a fundamental right for constitutional
purposes. And Casey's broad definition of "liberty," on which the
argument put so much reliance, was part of the Court's explica-
tion as to why abortion had been held to be a fundamental right
in Roe. In other words, the Court, consistent with the line of
growth of constitutional doctrine applicable to recognition of
fundamental rights, could hold that the right to hasten inevitable
death was not a fundamental right for constitutional purposes,
and, applying the rational basis standard of review, could uphold
the constitutionality of an absolute ban on "assisted suicide."
This is exactly what the Court did in Glucksberg.
I have explained Roe v. Wade as a case where the Court was
engaging in constitutional balancing and making a value judg-
ment about the relative constitutional importance of the
woman's interest in reproductive freedom and the state's interest
in protecting potential human life, and it made that value judg-
ment in favor of the woman's reproductive freedom interest.
Without getting into a detailed discussion of the doctrinal and
other differences in the various opinions in Glucksberg, the fact
remains that all of the members of the Court in Glucksberg agreed
that the right of the terminally ill, in the end stages of their ter-
minal illness, to make the choice to hasten inevitable death, and
to have the assistance of a physician in doing so, was not a funda-
83. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
84. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
85. See San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
86. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
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mental right for constitutional purposes, and so upheld the con-
stitutionality of the challenged laws.87
Using the same constitutional balancing-value judgment
explanation of Glucksberg as I did of Roe v. Wade, I would have to
say that in Glucksberg the Court made the value judgment that the
various interests that the state asserted to justify a ban on physi-
cian-assisted suicide were constitutionally more important than the
interest of the terminally ill person, in the end stages of that per-
son's terminal illness, in making the choice to hasten inevitable
death by the use of physician-prescribed medications. I will now
discuss some of the factors that may have influenced the Court to
make the value judgment that it did.
In constitutional litigation, as a distinguished constitutional
scholar has observed, "[i] t is critically important that we get the
87. ChiefJustice Rehnquist wrote the opinion for the Court in both cases.
In arguing for a narrow interpretation of the "liberty" protected by the Due
Process Clause, the ChiefJustice insisted that the Due Process Clause protected
only those liberties that were "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition," or that were "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." See
Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2268 (1997). He then went on to
demonstrate that "assisted suicide" did not fall into either of these categories.
See id. at 2269-71. Taking issue with the Chief Justice on this point, Justice
Souter invoked the "legitimacy of the modem justification for judicial review
[under the Due Process Clause]," as set forth injustice Harlan's dissent in Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting), which Justice Souter
said had been adopted by the Court in Casey and other decisions. See Glucksberg,
117 S. Ct. at 2277 n.4 (Souter, J., concurring). According to Justice Souter, this
approach "avoids the absolutist failing of many older cases without embracing
the opposite pole of equating reasonableness with past practice described at a
very specific level." Id. at 2281. While recognizing the importance of the
asserted individual interests of the terminally ill patients, Justice Souter
concluded that in the circumstances of this case, that interest was not
"fundamental," since the state's asserted interests were "sufficiently serious to
defeat the present claim that the law is arbitrary or purposeless." Id. at 2290.
Justice O'Connor, emphasizing that the plaintiffs in this case were not asserting
that there were any legal barriers to their obtaining adequate pain-killing
medication, agreed with Justice Souter that "the state's interests in protecting
those who are not truly competent or facing imminent death, or those whose
decisions to hasten death would not truly be voluntary, are sufficiently weighty
to justify a prohibition against physician-assisted suicide." Id. at 2303
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg concurred injustice O'Connor's
opinion, andJustice Breyer took essentially the same position. See id. at 2310-12
(Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Stevens, while concurring in the judgment,
argued that "there is room for further debate about the limits that the
Constitution places on the power of the States to punish the practice [of
physician assisted suicide]," id. at 2304 (Stevens, J., concurring), and that "it is
clear that the 'unqualified interest in the preservation of human life' is not
itself sufficient to outweigh the interest in liberty that may justify the only
possible means of preserving a dying patient's dignity and alleviating her
intolerable suffering." Id. at 2310.
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questions right and the answers right, because constitutional law
is written in concrete and is not easily washed out by rain or
tears."88  Throughout the constitutional litigation that
culminated in Glucksberg, the proponents and the opponents of a
constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide sharply dis-
agreed as to the formulation of the issue that ultimately would be
decided by the Court. The proponents of recognition of this
constitutional right argued that the issue was whether terminally
ill persons, in the end stages of their terminal illness, had a con-
stitutionally-protected right to make the choice to hasten inevita-
ble death with the assistance of a physician. They argued that the
case only involved the constitutional rights of the terminally ill,
and that the terminally ill, in the end stages of their terminal
illness, should have the choice to hasten inevitable death instead
of "undergoing unbearable suffering until death comes natu-
rally."89 The opponents of recognition of a constitutional right
to physician-assisted suicide, such as Professor Yale Kamisar,
insisted that there was no principled way to limit the claimed
right to the terminally ill or to those suffering unbearable physi-
cal pain, and that what the proponents were really contending
for was a broader right to "commit suicide."9 °
The Court in Glucksberg defined the issue as it was defined by
the opponents of a right to physician-assisted suicide. The Court
noted that "we have a tradition of carefully formulating the inter-
est at stake in substantive-due-process cases," and stated that "the
question before us is whether the 'liberty' specially protected by
the Due Process Clause includes a right to commit suicide which
itself includes a right to assistance in doing so. " "
In the same vein, proponents of a constitutional right to
physician-assisted suicide argued that there was no issue in the
cases before the Court as to possible abuses that could result
from recognition of such a right or with the problem of the "slip-
pery slope." The case, it was argued, only involved the constitu-
tionality of an absolute ban on physician-assisted suicide for the
terminally ill, that possible abuses could be dealt with by reason-
able regulation, and that recognition of a constitutional right to
assisted suicide for the terminally ill would not lead us down the
"slippery slope" to something like involuntary euthanasia.92
88. Dixon, supra note 1, at 70.
89. Sedler, Constitutional Challenges, supra note 2, at 787.
90. See Yale Kamisar, Against Assisted Suicide-Even a Very Limited Form, 72
U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 735, 735-45 (1995).
91. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2258.
92. See Sedler, Constitutional Challenges, supra note 2, at 790-94.
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The opponents of a constitutional right to physician-assisted
suicide, to the contrary, insisted that the Court could not avoid
concerns with possible abuses and with the problems of the "slip-
pery slope."9" Possible abuses had been identified by a New York
State Task Force, which unanimously recommended that existing
law should not be changed to permit assisted suicide. The Task
Force found that permitting assisted suicide would create serious
risks for the elderly, the poor and the socially disadvantaged:
[I]t must be remembered that assisted suicide and eutha-
nasia will be practiced through the prism of social inequal-
ity and prejudice that characterizes the delivery of services
in all segments of society, including health care. Those
who will be most vulnerable to abuse, error or indifference
are the poor, minorities, and those who are least educated
and least empowered. . . . [Many patients] in large,
overburdened facilities serving the urban and rural
poor... will not have the benefit of skilled pain manage-
ment and comfort care. Indeed, a recent study found that
patients treated for cancer at centers that care predomi-
nantly for minority individuals were three times more likely
to receive inadequate therapy to relieve pain. Many
patients also lack access to psychiatric services. Further-
more, for most patients who are terminally or severely ill,
routine psychiatric consultation would be inadequate to
diagnose reliably whether the patient is suffering from
depression.
94
For these persons, then, the contention was that there would be a
serious question as to whether any decision to hasten death
would be truly "voluntary."
The Court expressly took these concerns into account in
Glucksberg. In the context of holding that the Washington law
was rationally related to advancing legitimate state interests, the
Court quoted at length from the Task Force Report, noting that
those who attempt suicide, terminally ill or not, often suffer from
depression or other mental disorders, that the state has an inter-
est in protecting vulnerable groups, such as the poor, the elderly
and disabled persons, from abuse, neglect, and mistakes, and
from overt and subtle coercion to hasten their deaths. The
state's assisted-suicide ban, said the Court, also reflects and
93. See generally Kamisar, supra note; see also Thomas Marzen et al., Suicide:
A Constitutional Right, 24 DuQ. L. REv. 1, 100-47 (1985).
94. NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, WHEN DEATH IS
SOUGHT: ASSISTED SUICIDE IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT 125, 143 (1994) (footnotes
omitted) [hereinafter WHEN DEATH IS SOUGHT].
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enforces its policy that the lives of terminally ill, disabled and
elderly people must be no less valued than the lives of the young
and healthy.95  Finally, the Court joined the opponents of
assisted suicide in a journey down the "slippery slope," saying
that the state "may fear that permitting assisted suicide will start it
down the path to voluntary and perhaps even involuntary
euthanasia."96
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Court, especially
in the opinions of the concurring Justices, rejected the attempt
of the proponents of physician-assisted suicide to cast the consti-
tutional claim in terms of a right to hasten death in order to be
free from unbearable suffering. Proponents of physician-assisted
suicide argued that terminally ill persons, in the end stages of
their terminal illness, "must have the right to decide whether to
undergo unbearable suffering until death comes naturally, or to
hasten their inevitable death by the use of physician-prescribed
medications."97 As discussed earlier, the social context in which
the constitutional challenges to bans on physician-assisted sui-
cide arose included the failure of the terminally ill to receive ade-
quate pain medication to alleviate their pain and suffering. It
will be recalled that, according to the Report of the Institute of
Medicine, "[s] tudies have repeatedly indicated that a significant
proportion of dying patients and patients with advanced disease
experience serious pain, despite the availability of effective and
other options for relieving most pain," and that, "[o] utdated and
scientifically-flawed drug-prescribing laws, regulations, and inter-
pretations by state medical boards continue to frustrate and
intimidate physicians who wish to relieve their patient's pain."98
However, while the constitutional challenges were wending
their way through the lower courts, the American Medical Associ-
ation expressly recognized that physicians had the ethical respon-
sibility to prescribe all the pain medication that was necessary to
alleviate the patient's suffering, even if this would hasten the
patient's death. 9 Assuming that terminally ill patients, in fact
receive all the pain medication necessary to alleviate their suffer-
95. See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2273.
96. Id. at 2274. See also the discussion of these concerns in Justice
Souter's concurring opinion, see id. at 2290-93 (Souter, J., concurring).
97. Sedler, Constitutional Challenges, supra note 2, at 787.
98. APPROACHING DEATH, supra note 60, at Sum-4.
99. See COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AMERICAN MEDICAL
ASSOCIATION, REPORT, reprinted in 10 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 90, 94-95 (1994)
[hereinafter REPORT] ; COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AMERICAN
MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, DECISIONS NEAR THE END OF LIFE, reprinted in 267 JAMA
2229, 2231 (1992) [hereinafter DECISIONS NEAR THE END OF LIFE].
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ing, their claim of a constitutional right to make the choice to
hasten inevitable death can no longer be founded on the need to
avoid "unbearable suffering."
In her Glucksberg concurrence in which Justice Ginsburg
joined, Justice O'Connor, stated that the proponents of a consti-
tutional right to assisted suicide were not asking the Court to rec-
ognize a generalized right to "commit suicide," but instead were
asking the Court to address "the narrower question of whether a
mentally competent person who is experiencing great suffering
has a constitutionally cognizable interest in controlling the cir-
cumstances of his or her imminent death."' '° Justice O'Connor
went on to say, however, that there was no need for the Court to
reach that question in the context of the facial challenge to the
Washington and New York laws, because, "there is no dispute
that dying patients in Washington and New York can obtain pallia-
tive care even when doing so would hasten their deaths."'O' Justice
Breyer also emphasized that the laws of Washington and New
York "do not prohibit doctors from providing patients with drugs
sufficient to control pain despite the risk that those drugs them-
selves will kill," and said that the right to be free from unbearable
pain would be central to any constitutional claim of a right to
hasten inevitable death. If such a situation were presented, said
Justice Breyer, "the Court might have to revisit its conclusions in
these cases."' ' 2 Justice Stevens likewise emphasized that where
palliative care was inadequate to alleviate all pain and suffering,
the state's interest in preventing potential abuse and mistake
would only be minimally implicated, and that he would not "fore-
close the possibility that an individual plaintiff seeking to hasten
her death, or a doctor whose assistance was sought, could prevail
in a more particularized challenge.""0 3 And in his opinion for
the Court in Vacco, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that New York
permitted physicians to provide aggressive palliative care, and
stated that in this situation, the physician's intent was only to ease
his patient's pain. For this reason he concluded that a distinc-
tion between permitting physicians to provide aggressive pallia-
tive care and prohibiting them from assisting in the patient's
suicide was reasonable,10 4 a point that Justice Souter also made
in his Vacco concurrence.
1 0 5
100. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2303 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
101. Id. at 2303 (emphasis added).
102. Id. at 2311-12 (Breyer, J., concurring).
103. Id. at 2308-09 (Stevens, J., concurring).
104. See Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2302 n.12 (1997).
105. See id. at 2302 (Souter, J., concurring).
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My point here is that the Court's holding in Glucksberg that
the right of the terminally ill to make the choice to hasten inevi-
table death was not a fundamental right for constitutional pur-
poses was clearly predicated on the assumption that the
terminally ill person was not being denied adequate pain medica-
tion. In effect then, the issue in Glucksberg was formulated in
terms of whether a terminally ill person, in the end stages of that
person's terminal illness, who was not suffering unbearable pain, had
a fundamental right to make the choice to hasten inevitable
death, and the Court held that the person did not. The Court's
formulation of the issue, relating to the facts of those cases, and
to the current approved medical practice of providing adequate
pain medication to terminally ill persons, even at the risk of has-
tening inevitable death, made the constitutional claim signifi-
cantly less cogent than it was when the issue was formulated in
terms of an entitlement to be free from unbearable pain and
suffering.
Since the issue in Glucksberg was formulated by the Court in
this way, and since as the Court emphasized, neither Washington
nor New York had a law that prohibited physicians from prescrib-
ing adequate pain medication, it can now be contended that a
terminally ill person should have a constitutionally-protected
right to receive adequate pain medication, even though this may
have the effect of hastening inevitable death. As discussed above,
at least five of the Justices in Glucksberg, O'Connor, Ginsburg, Ste-
vens, Souter and Breyer, indicated that they were open to recog-
nizing the existence of such a right. If such a right is recognized,
this means, as Justice Breyer pointed out in Glucksberg, that the
state cannot "prohibit doctors from providing patients with drugs
sufficient to control pain despite the risk that those drugs them-
selves will kill."1°6 It also would mean that state laws prohibiting
"assisted suicide," whether they expressly say so or not, must be
interpreted as not including within the definition of "assisted sui-
cide" a physician's furnishing of death-hastening pain medica-
tion to a terminally ill patient.
I think it highly unlikely that the Court will ever have to con-
front this question directly. It is difficult to imagine any state
legislature today enacting a law that would prohibit physicians
from providing adequate pain medication for the terminally ill,
or any state court interpreting the state law on "assisted suicide"
to include such a prohibition. In the absence of a legal prohibi-
tion, physicians are ethically required to provide death-hastening
106. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2311 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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pain medication.1" 7 Operationally then, we may say that the ter-
minally ill do have a legally-protected right, constitutionally-
based or not, to receive adequate pain medication, even though
this may have the effect of hastening their inevitable death.
In Glucksberg, the Court also appeared to explicitly affirm
what it had assumed in Cruzan, that all persons have a constitu-
tionally protected right to refuse or discontinue life-saving medi-
cal treatment. Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that, "[g] iven the
common-law rule that forced medication was a battery, and the
long legal tradition protecting the decision to refuse unwanted
medical treatment, our assumption [in Cruzan] was entirely con-
sistent with this Nation's history and constitutional traditions. ' 108
It may be assumed, therefore, that the Constitution protects a
person's right to refuse or discontinue life-saving medical treat-
ment. And in any event, it is impossible to imagine any state
enacting a law denying this right. Operationally then, we may say
that the terminally ill, like all other persons, have a legally-pro-
tected right to refuse or discontinue life-saving medical
treatment.
We thus see that one of the consequences of the constitu-
tional controversy over assisted suicide that culminated in the
Glucksberg decision has been some substantial degree of legal protection
to the claimed right of terminally ill persons to have a "good death."' 9 It
will be recalled that the Institute of Medicine Report identified
"in perverse counterpoint" the two most common components of
a "bad death": "the aggressive use of ineffectual and intrusive
interventions that may prolong and even dishonor the period of
dying," and "experiencing serious pain, despite the availability of
effective and other options for relieving most pain."110 The legal
system now clearly protects the right of the terminally ill to avoid
both of these components of a "bad death." Specifically, termi-
nally ill persons clearly have a legally-protected right to refuse or
discontinue lifesaving medical treatment, and with it, the right to
prevent the "aggressive use of ineffectual and intrusive interven-
tions." ' Likewise, they have the legally protected right to be
107. See supra text accompanying note 95.
108. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2270.
109. See APPROACHING DEATH, supra note 60, at 1-8.
110. Id. at Sum-4.
111. For constitutional purposes, of course, this right can only be
implicated by "state action," such as by a law changing the common law rule
that a person has the right to refuse or discontinue life-saving medical
treatment. It is difficult to imagine any state enacting such a law, and if a state
did so, the law would be declared unconstitutional. By the same token, if a
physician refused to discontinue lifesaving medical treatment when directed to
do so by the patient, the physician would be liable for a common-law battery.
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free from unbearable pain and to receive all the medication nec-
essary to alleviate pain even though this may have the effect of
hastening their inevitable death.
Of equal importance is societal acceptance of both of these
propositions. Unlike the controversy over abortion, the contro-
versy over physician-assisted suicide is not a controversy between
sharp antagonists (even though both proponents and opponents
of physician-assisted suicide sometimes try to portray it that way).
In the abortion context, the woman's claim of entitlement to an
abortion is a claim of entitlement to control over her own body,
which can only be recognized by permitting her to have an abor-
tion. But if the woman does have an abortion, she will be
destroying the potential life of the fetus she is carrying, which to
the opponents of abortion is the destruction of human life in the
same manner as if she had killed an infant child. The conflicting
claims of the proponents and opponents of abortion cannot be
reconciled, and any "compromise," such as allowing an abortion
only in certain circumstances, will not resolve the underlying
conflict.
Both the proponents and opponents of assisted suicide,
however, share a common goal, the protection of the terminally
ill in the process of dying and concern for their being able to
have a "good death." The disagreement is over whether a "good
death" for the terminally ill should include the right to physician-
assisted suicide. But the opponents of physician-assisted suicide,
no less than the proponents, seemingly agree both that the ter-
minally ill should have the right to refuse or discontinue life-sav-
ing medical treatment and that they should have the right to
receive death-hastening pain medication. This point was empha-
sized by the states and by all the amici opposed to assisted suicide
in Glucksberg and Vacco. The crucial point of disagreement
between the proponents and the opponents of physician-assisted
suicide then turned out to be whether there was a constitution-
ally significant distinction between a patient's refusal or discon-
tinuance of lifesaving medical treatment and a physician's
prescription of death-hastening medications, on the one hand,
and the physician's providing the patient with lethal medications
that the patient could take in order to hasten inevitable death,
on the other hand. The Supreme Court agreed with the oppo-
nents of physician-assisted suicide that there was a constitution-
ally significant distinction, and that is the end of the matter. The
Constitution does not protect the right of the terminally ill, in
the end stages of their terminal illness, to make the choice to
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hasten inevitable death by the use of physician-prescribed
medications. 112
In American society today then terminally ill persons no
longer face the fearful prospect of being kept alive against their
will while at the same time being forced to suffer unbearable
pain. They have the right to make the choice to refuse or discon-
tinue lifesaving medical treatment. They have the right to
receive all the medication that is necessary to alleviate their pain
even if this will have the effect of hastening their deaths. They
have the right to terminal sedation. What they do not have is the
right to make the choice to "die at once" by the use of physician-
prescribed medications, even in the end stages of their terminal
illness. If they are not receiving lifesaving medical treatment, but
are receiving all the medication necessary to alleviate their pain,
they do not have a constitutionally protected right to decide that
they are "ready to die" now, and with the assistance of a physi-
112. It will be recalled that the basis of the Court's equal protection
holding in Vacco was that it was rational for the state to make a distinction
between a physician's complying with a person's decision to refuse or withdraw
life-saving medical treatment, and a physician's affirmatively assisting a
terminally ill person to "commit suicide." The distinction, said the Court,
.comports with fundamental legal principles of causation and intent." Vacco v.
Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2298 (1997). When the patient refuses treatment, the
cause of death is the underlying disease, but when the patient ingests lethal
medication prescribed by a physician, the patient is killed by that medication.
And when the physician complies with the patient's decision to refuse
treatment, the physician is honoring the patient's wishes and is not acting with
the intent to kill the patient. The Court went on to make the same point about
causation and intent in the context of a physician's providing aggressive
palliative care: while painkilling drugs may hasten death, the physician's
purpose is to ease the patient's pain rather than to bring about the patient's
death. See id. at 2298-99.
The American Medical Association has strongly defended the distinction as
a matter of medical ethics:
Assisted suicide and euthanasia should not be confused with the
provision of palliative treatment that may hasten the patient's death
("double effect"). The intent of the palliative treatment is to relieve
pain and suffering, not to end the patient's life, but the patient's
death is a possible side effect of the treatment. It is ethically
acceptable for a physician to gradually increase the appropriate
medication for a patient, realizing that the medication may depress
respiration and cause death. Assisted suicide also must be
distinguished from withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining
treatment, in which the patient's death occurs because the patient or
the patient's proxy, in consultation with the treating physician,
decides that the disadvantages of treatment outweigh its disadvantages
and therefore that treatment is refused.
REPORT, supra note 99, at 92; see also id. at 93-96; DECISIONS NEAR THE END OF
LIFE, supra note 99, at 2229-31.
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cian, to "die at once." In other words, for the terminally ill, in
the end stages of their terminal illness, there is a "right to die"
slowly and under sedation, but there is no "right to die all at
once."113
The likely political effect of the Supreme Court's decision in
Glucksberg will be to entrench existing laws against physician-
assisted suicide. Because the matter is so politically controversial,
it would not be expected that most legislatures would be dis-
posed to enact laws authorizing physician-assisted suicide, even in
limited circumstances. In some states, it may be possible to
launch a successful petition drive to legalize physician-assisted
suicide, but this effort would face formidable obstacles, as the
opponents of physician-assisted suicide would raise concerns
about possible abuse and the specter of the "slippery slope."'1 14
The terminally ill who want to make the choice to hasten
inevitable death and to "die all at once" are now effectively
deprived of this choice and likely will continue to be so deprived
in the foreseeable future. Just as prior to Roe v. Wade, physicians
were deterred from performing abortions by state anti-abortion
laws, today physicians will be deterred from providing their ter-
minally ill patients with lethal medications and instruction in
their use by state laws prohibiting assisted suicide. And even if a
physician is willing to risk a criminal prosecution because of the
unlikelihood of a jury voting to convict, the physician still faces
the loss of his or her medical license in disciplinary proceedings.
The prudent physician, therefore, will stay far away from physi-
cian-assisted suicide. Unlike abortion, therefore, physician-
113. For press discussions of current medical practice and the terminally
ill, see Gina Kolata, 'Passive Euthanasia' Is the Norm in Today's Hospitals, Doctors
Say, N.Y. TIMES,June 28, 1997, at 1; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Cries of the Dying Awaken
Doctors to a New Approach, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1997, at 1.
114. I commented on this matter immediately after the Glucksberg
decision:
'It entrenches the existing laws against assisted suicide,' said Robert
Sedler, a professor of constitutional law at Wayne State University in
Detroit who has argued in favor of legalizing assisted suicide before
the State Supreme Court in Michigan, which became a focal point for
the debate after Dr. Jack Kevorkian began helping terminally ill
patients die. 'The proponents of assisted suicide will have a heavy
burden getting legislatures to repeal them.'
Janny Scott, An Issue That Won't Die, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1997, at 1. Professor
Yale Kamisar, a strong opponent of physician-assisted suicide, has recently
argued that there should not be legal recognition of a right to physician-assisted
suicide, even in the most "compelling, heartwrenching case." SeeYale Kamisar,
Physician-Assisted Suicide: The Problems Presented by the Compelling, Heartwrenching
Case, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 1121 (1998).
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assisted suicide is not now operationally acceptable in American
society.
CONCLUSION
In this article, I have undertaken an examination of how
abortion and physician-assisted suicide have been "taken into our
constitutional system," and of the societal impact of the Supreme
Court's constitutional treatment of these issues. We see that in
American society today, a woman's right to have a safe and legal
abortion is operationally acceptable, but the right of the termi-
nally ill, in the end stages of their terminal illness, to make the
choice to hasten inevitable death with the assistance of a physi-
cian is not. The difference between the operational acceptability
of the woman's right to a safe and legal abortion and the absence
of operational acceptability of the terminally ill person's right to
make the choice to hasten inevitable death is explainable, in my
opinion, by Supreme Court decisions, a quarter-century apart,
reflecting different value judgments about the meaning of Con-
stitution as it relates to the beginning and end of life.
